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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR 
STRATEGIC A TT ACK 
To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack 
forces through mid-1969 and to estimate general trends in those forces 
over the next 10 years. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Soviet programs for strategic attack forces have been aimed at 
narrowing the lead that the US has held in this field. In addition 
to military considerations, the Soviets undoubtedly see political and 
psychological advantages in improving their position relative to that 
of the US. Soviet strategic policy has recognized that its first aim must 
be to maintain a credible deterrent, not only against US nuclear attack 
on the USSR but also against US actions that · would endanger Soviet 
vital interests. They have been building strategic attack forces to 
assure that, however nuclear war began, the US would face destruction 
on a scale unacceptable to its leadership. Beyond this, they are also 
seeking, through both offensive and defensive strategic programs, to 
limit the damage they would sustain should general war occur. 
B. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that their rela-
tive strategic position has improved markedly in recent years, pri-
marily as the result of extensive intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) deployment. We estimate that the ICBNf force has more 
than tripled in the past 2 years, that it now has about 700 operational 
launchers, and that by the end of 1968 will have about 1,000, approxi-
mately the same number as the US. We believe that most of these 
(nearly 80 percent ) will be in dispersed, hardened single silos, greatly 





will remain inferior, however, in numbers of bombers and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly 
realize that even this relative improvement in their position does not 
promise to be permanent. Consequently, they almost certainly be-
lieve that to improve their strategic position vis-a-vis the US requires 
continued effort. 
C. For the longer term, Soviet leaders face decisions of increasing 
complexity and uncertainty. One reason is the inescapable inter-
action between US and Soviet strategic capabilities in the 1970' s. 
Even with no increase in the number of US launchers, planned improve-
ments in the US strategic attack forces during the next decade will 
confront the Soviets with much greater numbers of more sophisticated 
warheads. Moscow must also be concerned that the planned "thin" 
US antiballistic missile (ABM) defense might be expanded to provide 
significant damage-limiting capabilities against Soviet forces. 
D. Another complicating factor is that their strong research and 
development (R&D) effort has given the Soviets a broader range of 
options than in the past, and their programs will almost certainly reflect 
different priorities from those which have hitherto been controlling. 
They probably will place greater emphasis on qualitative improve-
ments-including survivability, capacity to avoid early warning (EW) 
and to penetrate enemy defenses, accuracy, and reliability. The 
strategic situation emerging in the 1970's will make these qualities 
more important than sheer numbers of launchers. 
E. If the Soviets believed that they could obtain a meaningful ad-
vantage over the US in strategic forces, they would, of course, attempt 
to do so, and they may forge ahead in one or another particular field. 
In deciding whether to undertake any new weapon program, however, 
they would have to weigh the prospective gain against the economic 
cost and the capabilities of the US to detect and counter it. In en-
deavoring to improve their overall strategic posture, they will be alert 
to improving their counterforce and damage-limiting capability in the 
belief this would not only deter the US from nuclear war but would 
also reduce US opposition to aggressive Soviet actions in support of 
political objectives elsewhere in the world. As indicated by our pro-
jections of Soviet forces for the next 10 years, however, we believe 
that they will not consider it feasible to achieve strategic capabilities 
TS 190391 
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which would permit them to launch a first strike against the US with-
out receiving unacceptable damage in return. 
F. ICBMs. We estimate that the Soviet ICBM force will number 
something more than 1,000, but is not likely to exceed 1,300 launchers 
by mid-1972; by mid-1977 we estimate a force numbering more than 
1,000, but not exceeding 1,500 launchers.1 A force near the low side, 
say 1,100, would reflect a deliberate Soviet decision for political reasons 
to hold the number of launchers at a level about equal to that of the 
US. Regardless of their decisions as to number of launchers, the So-
viets will probably begin deployment of at least one new ICBM system 
within the next few years. We believe that the Soviets are flight 
testing a small solid-propellant ICBM and may be developing a new 
large liquid-propellant system. They are probably investigating a 
mobile ICBlv1 system and may deploy one. Qualitative improvements 
may include more sophisticated reentry vehicles (RVs), penetration 
aids, multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs), multiple independently-
targeted RVs (MIRVs), hardened warheads, and better accuracy. 
G. Space Weapons. For almost 2 years, the Soviets have been 
conducting flight tests which we believe relate to development of a 
fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS). We believe that the 
chances are better than even that the Soviets will within the next few 
years deploy a FOBS in order to negate or delay US warning and 
otherwise complicate the US defense problem; any deployment would 
be in relatively small numbers. We consider it unlikely that they 
will deploy a multiple-orbit bombardment system (MOBS) in view 
of the probable adverse political consequences and of its cost and 
effectiveness as compared to other systems. 
H. MRBM/IRBMs. The Soviets will continue to maintain massive 
strategic forces against Eurasia. We estimate that new :NIRBM and 
IRBMs will supersede present systems within the next 10 years, and 
1 Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would delete 
the first sentence and substitute the following: "We estimate that the Soviet ICBM force in 
the mid-1970's wlll number more than 1,000 but is not likely to exceed 1,500 launchers if the 
USSR by then has operationally deployed missiles with some type of multiple reentry vehicles. 
Otherwise, and particularly in view of the numbers of targets in the US and the planned US 
ABM capability, the Soviet Union probably will have considerably more than 1,500 launchers. 
A program which added only 100 launchers per year beyond those already identified would 
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that the introduction of improved missiles may result in some decrease 
in numbers. We believe that one or more new missiles in this cate-
gory could become operational as early as 1969. Some of the new 
missiles may be deployed in mobile launchers. 
I. Submarine-Launched Missiles. The Soviets are clearly placing 
increased emphasis on ballistic missile submarines. They are intro-
ducing a new nuclear-powered class of ballistic missile submarine with 
16 launch tubes which we believe will carry a missile with a range of 
about 1,500 n.m. \Ve estimate that, by the mid-1970's, the Soviets 
will have twice as many ballistic missile submarines as at present, and 
six to seven times as many launchers. 
J. Long Range Aviation ( LRA). Attrition and retirement of older 
models will gradually reduce the heavy bomber force. We still believe 
that the Soviets are unlikely to introduce a follow-on heavy bomber. 
The medium bomber force will probably decline as Badgers are phased 
out; by the mid-1970's it will probably be composed largely of the 
supersonic-dash Blinder.2 
~Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes the 
Soviet Union will continue to consider manned strategic aircraft an important clement of 
their intercontinental strike forces. He estimates the USSR is likely to introduce both a 
follow-on heavy bomber and a new medium bomber into LRA within the period of this esti-
mate. He expects that in the mid-1970's LRA still will include about 200 heavy bombers 
(approximately the same number as at present), and some 400-oOO medium bombers of both 
new and old types. 
TS 190391 
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DISCUSSION 
I. TRENDS IN POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
1. Our estimate of overall Soviet military policy and doctrine appears in NIE 
11-4-67, "Main Trends in Soviet :Military Policy," dated 20 July 1967, SECRET. 
As we emphasized there, the most important issues of Soviet military policy 
center upon the strategic relationship with the US, and strategic weapons continue 
to receive primary emphasis in Soviet planning, deployment, research and de-
velopment ( R&D). Soviet strategic policy has recognized that its first aim must 
be to maintain a credible deterrent; the Soviets are building forces which we 
believe are giving them greatly increased confidence in their ability, even in re-
taliation, to assure the destruction of a significant portion of the US population 
and industrial resources. Beyond this, they are also seeking, through both offen-
sive and defensive strategic programs, to improve their ability to limit the damage 
they would sustain should general war occur. 
2. The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that their relative strategic posi-
tion has already improved markedly. They are aware that US deployment of 
strategic missile launchers has leveled off; their own intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) deployment programs, which have been underway for the past 
few years, will give them a rough parity with the US in numbers of ICBM 
launchers within the next year or so. After many years of strategic inferiority, 
they undoubtedly see political and psychological advantages in the attainment 
of such parity even though it does not alter the basic situation of mutual deter-
rence and still leaves them inferior in heavy bombers and submarine-launched 
missiles. 
3. Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly realize that even this relative im-
provement in their position does not promise to be permanent. For the longer 
term, they are aware of announced US programs for various qualitative improve-
ments in strategic missile forces which would erode relative Soviet strength. 
They must also calculate the effects of the US decision to begin antiballistic 
missile (ABM) deployment, allowing not only for the system as- announced but 
also for the possibility of its expansion. 
4. To maintain an assured destruction capability in the strategic situation 
that is emerging, qualitative improvements, particularly those related to sur-
vivability and capacity to penetrate enemy defenses, become more important than 
sheer numbers of launchers. There will undoubtedly be pressures for a con-
tinuing enlargement of the ICBM force, and it may continue to grow. But 
having attained rough numerical parity in ICBMs with the US, the Soviet planners 
will probably give increased attention to other options. Further measures to 




a greater emphasis on ballistic missile submarines, development of a mobile 
ICBM, ABM defense of ICBM launching sites, and a variety of systems designed 
to elude or penetrate US ABM defenses. 
5. Thus, the Soviets face a number of uncertainties in deciding what force 
composition and force levels they should attempt to acquire for the 1970's. The 
interaction between US and Soviet strategic programs introduces extraordinary 
complications and variables. But given the technical complexities and long lead 
times required for modern weapons, the Soviet leaders must already have made 
some decisions for future strategic systems, and will have to make others before 
long. Whatever their specific decisions, we believe that they are determined to 
maintain an assured destruction capability, and that they will seek to improve 
their strategic position vis-a-vis the US. 
6. The internal situation appears favorable to continuation of a strong military 
effort. The present leadership is evidently more responsive than was Khrushchev 
to the views of the military hierarchy. We estimate that military and space 
expenditures for 1967 represent an increase of 16 percent over 1965, a decided 
change from the more stable spending level of 1963-1965. It is not yet clear how 
the recent 15 percent increase in the publicly stated Soviet defense budget 
may relate to actual expenditures. Some of it probably reflects programs for 
military aid to Vietnam and the Middle East, as well as changes in the Soviet 
price structure and accounting practice. In any case, however, we think it 
clear that real Soviet military expenditures are continuing to rise. 
7. The continuing development and large-scale deployment of strategic weap-
ons has been largely responsible for the increase in these expenditures of the 
past few years. The Soviets have given roughly equal weight to forces for 
strategic attack and for strategic defense. We cannot estimate at this time how 
the increase in 1968 defense expenditures will be allocated among the various 
force components, but the high priority of strategic programs is almost certain 
to continue. 
8. We believe that the Soviets' effort to improve their strategic position relative 
to the US-already evident in their ICBM deployment-will be extended to 
some other components of their strategic attack forces, and that they may see an 
opportunity to forge ahead in some particular field. We believe that they will 
also continue to maintain massive strategic forces against Eurasia. And they 
will almost certainly pursue intensive R&D on strategic attack systems, both in 
order to prevent the US from gaining a technological advantage and to gain any 
advantage they can for themselves. In deciding whether to develop and deploy 
any new weapon system, however, they would have to weigh the prospective 
gain against the economic cost and the capabilities of the US to detect and 
counter it. 
9. In considering the goals of their strategic weapons programs, the Soviet 
leaders will, of course, examine the possibility of achieving a first-strike counter-
TS 190391 
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force capability which-in conjunction with their strategic defenses-would be 
sufficient to limit to acceptable proportions the damage which a US retaliatory 
strike could inflict on the USSR. Considering the number, hardness, and reaction 
times ·of US targets which would have to be struck in such an attack, and the 
likelihood that many would escape destruction, such a Soviet effort would require 
not only a very large, highly sophisticated strategic attack force, but also wide-
spread and effective air and missile defenses as well as an effective antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) capability. The technological and economic magnitude of the task 
would be formidable, however, and the Soviets would have to consider the likeli-
hood that the US would detect and match or overmatch the Soviet effort. In en-
deavoring to improve their overall strategic posture they will be alert to 
improving their counterforce and damage-limiting capability in the belief this 
would not only deter the US from nuclear war but would also reduce US oppo-
sition to aggressive Soviet actions in support of political objectives elsewhere in 
the world. All things considered, however, we continue to believe that the Soviet 
leaders will not expect to acquire strategic capabilities which they would deem 
sufficient to permit them to launch a first strike against the US without receiving 
unacceptable damage in return. 
II. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES 
A. Current Deployment 
10. We believe that within the past year, hard, single-silo launchers have 
come to comprise the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. We estimate the present 
strength of the force to be about 700 operational launchers, deployed in 25 large 
complexes across the central USSR. We estimate that more than 450 of these 
launchers are single silos for the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBM systems; older systems, 
which are deployed in soft sites or in triple-silo hard sites, account for the 
remainder. 
11. Status of First and Second Generation ICBM Sites. We estimate that 
virtually all of the first and second generation ICBM launchers remain opera-
tional, most of them employing the SS-7 ICBM. We believe that two of the 
four SS-6 launchers have been assigned a primary space role; the other two will 
probably also be allocated to the space program or phased out altogether in the 
near future. We believe that the 14 soft SS-8 launchers will have been phased 
out by mid-1969. We believe that the nine hard SS-8 launchers remain oper-
ational. 
12. In previous estimates we considered the possibility that a group of SS-7 
triple-silo launch sites had been equipped with the SS-9 ICBM. We now believe, 
however, that these sites are equipped with SS-7s and that SS-9s are deployed 
only in the single-silo configuration. We have no evidence suggesting phase-
out of any SS-7 launchers, and believe that they will remain operational for some 
time to come. 
TS 190391 
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B. Force Levels and Composition to Mid-1969 
13. \.Ve believe that the Soviets are developing new ICBMs and that at least 
one of them could be ready for operational deployment soon,3 but we doubt that 
it will reach IOC in hard sites by mid-1989. Our estimate of the Soviet ICBM 
force for the next 2 years includes only types now operational, but we do not rule 
out the possibility that it will include a few missiles of a new type. 
ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS 
1 OCTOBER 1967 Mm-1968 Mm-1969 
Soft 
SS-6 . ... . ..... .. .. . ... . .. ' 2 0 0 
SS-7 .................... .. 128 128 128 
SS-8 . ...... .. .... . . .. ... . . 14 0-14 0 
Subtotal ... . ....... . ..... 144 128-142 128 
Hard ( triple-silo) 
SS-7 . . . . . . . . .... .. ....... 89 69 69 
SS-8 . . . ... . ..... ... ... .... 9 9 9 -Subtotal ..... . ... . .. .. . . . 78 78 78 
Hard (single-silo) 
Large ( SS-9) ..... . .. .... . . 114 162-174 180-222 
Small ( SS-11) . ..... .. ...... 330-380 480-530 560-610 
Subtotal ................. 444-494 642-704 740-832 
TOTAL• ............ . . 666-716 848-924 946-1,038 
• In addition to the ICBM launchers cited above, we believe that the Soviets have 
about 50 launchers at the Tyuratam range which are associated with ICBM develop-
ment. About 40 of these launchers are considered to be complete, and we believe 
that most of them could be readied to fire at the US. We are unable to make any 
valid estimate of the time required to ready them, reaction times, or the availability 
of missiles for them. 
C. Operational Capabilities of the Force 
Survivability 
14. The vulnerability of the force is decreasing. 'tVe estimate that about 80 
percent of the current operational force is deployed in hard sites. We think it 
likely that by mid-1969 80 percent of the force will be in single silos. We believe 
that single-silo sites are so widely dispersed as to present separate aiming points. 
We believe that all hardened ICBM launchers deployed in the field are designed 
to remain completely operable when exposed to overpressures on the order of 
200-400 psi. 
3 See paragraph 22 below regarding the recent R&D firings of a solid-propellant ICBM. 
It might achieve IOC before mid-1969. Hence our estimate of ICBMs for the next 2 years 
may have to be modified. It is also possible that theL_] program relates to both ICBM 




Reliability and Reaction 
15. The continuing introduction of single silos has brought improvements in 
both reliability and reaction time. We believe that ICBMs deployed in single 
silos can be launched in 5 minutes or less after the execution order is received. 
Overall reliability of the SS-9 and SS-11 systems is probably somewhat higher 
than that of older systems. 
16. An extensive program of test firings of currently deployed systems has prob-
ably improved reliability, in terms of both equipment and training. During 
the past year, about 100 ICBMs have been launched primarily for purposes of 
production sampling and crew training. This is the highest yearly total ever 
observed. Firings included 41 SS-7s, 2 SS-8s, 12 SS-9s, and 45 SS-lls. 
Reentry Veh;cles 
17. Soviet ICBM tests observed during the past year continue to show reentry 
vehicles (RVs) with low ballistic coefficients and large radar cross sections. 
There is no evidence to show that the Soviets are trying to develop RVs with 
higher ballistic coefficients, which are more accurate and less vulnerable to 
detection and interception. On the other hand, the current Soviet RVs lend 
themselves to simpler design and packaging of nuclear weapons and may be 
more adaptable to hardening. 
18. We have virtually no evidence to indicate whether current Soviet RVs 
are designed to withstand nuclear radiation, but we believe that hardening of 
their RVs for this purpose is within the Soviet state of the art. If they have 
not already begun to harden, deployment of a US ABM defense would be an 
added incentive for them to do so. 
Accuracy 
19. Current Soviet ICBMs use radio-inertial or inertial guidance systems j _ j 
The SS-9, using radio-inertial 
guidance, is the most accurate ICBM in the inventory. We estimate that it has 
a CEP on the order of 0.5-0.75 nautical miles ( n.m.). With this accuracy 
and its large payload, the SS-9 is suitable for attacking hard targets. The SS-11 
has a relatively small payload and an estimated CEP Apparently 
accuracy was not a critical requirement for the SS-11; we e ieve t at the Soviet 
objective was to deploy rapidly a large number of survivable weapons for use 
against relatively soft targets. 
20. The Soviets may seek very high accuracies for some future ICBM systems. 
We have considered their capabilities to achieve accuracies of 0.25-0.5 n.m. Con-
sidering the techniques required and probable development times for new sys-
tems, we believe that the Soviets could achieve an operational system with a 
CEP of 0.5 n.m. about 1970 and 0.25 n.m. about 1972. To achieve CEPs in this 
TS 190391 
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range the Soviets would have to improve their guidance systems, probably intro-
duce midcourse corrections, and design new RVs for either faster reentry or 
limited terminal guidance maneuver. 
Refire 
21. We believe that Soviet soft launchers have a refire capability and that on 
the average two missiles are available for each such launcher. This gives the 
current force a theoretical refire capability of up to 140 ICBMs some 2-4 hours 
after the initial launch from soft sites. As soft sites are phased out, this capabil-
ity will decline. The hardened launchers are not considered capable of refire. 
D. ICBM Research and Development 
Solid Propellants 
22. We believe that there are an adequate number of solid-propellant manu-
facturing and test facilities within the USSR to support a rather ambitious solid-
propellant strategic missile program. We believe that the Soviets hllve a solid-
propellant ICBM under development. They have been testing solid-propellant 
missiles to ranges of 1,050 n.m. from Kapustin Yar and to 3,100 n.m. from Plesetsk 
for about 2 years. We believe that these two programs are related 1 
I I Recently (on 23 October), the Soviets _fir_e_d_ a -so- I-id---' 
propellant missile from Plesetsk to a range of about 4,750 n.m. We believe 
that this latest test is related I I 
Status of Mobile ICBMs 
23. The Soviets have displayed what they claim to be two mobile surface-to-
surface missile launchers and have claimed .that one of the missiles (Scrooge) 
has an intercontinental range. We have no information on such a missile, and 
there is no evidence that it has been Hight tested to ICBM range. We doubt 
that these missiles are prototypes of a mobile ICBM. The USSR, however, may 
develop a mobile missile to improve the survivability of its ICBM force. The 
SS-11 could be adapted for a mobile system, but we consider this unlikely. 
~---.....--~!would lend itself to mobile deployment but we have no evidence 
suggesting that this is the Soviet intent. 
Future ICBM Development 
24. As noted above, evidence of test firings from Plesetsk indicates that the 
Soviets have a small, solid-propellant ICBM in an advanced stage of develop-
ment. We estimate that this system will have about the same payload and 
accuracy as the SS-11. It would be adaptable to mobile deployment but we 
believe that it will be deployed, at least initially, in hard sites. We doubt that 
this system could become operational until about mid-1969. It could be de-
ployed in a mobile mode somewhat later. 
-TOP sECRf!f-
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25. We have detected no test firings of a new ICBM from Tyuratam for over 
two and one-half years but we estimate that at least one is in R&D. Until flight 
test begins, we cannot estimate its precise characteristics but we believe that 
the most likely possibility would be a large, liquid-propellant ICBM about the 
size of the SS-9, but having better performance, including some form of improved 
reentry system. This weapon could be either a modification of the SS-9 
or an entirely ne~ missile, and would probably be deployed in hard single silos. 
We estimate that it could reach IOC in the 1970-1972 period. 
26. The Soviets will also probably seek to improve the quality of their existing 
force by modification of the SS-11 and they may replace it with a new, small 
liquid-propelled ICBM system. Early improvements to the SS-11 could be 
aimed at better accuracy or the incorporation of penetration aids or multiple 
reentry vehicles (RVs). If they elect to replace the SS-11 with a new system, 
it would probably become operational in the mid-1970's. 
Reentry Vehicle Development 
27. The Soviets will almost certainly take steps to reduce the vulnerability of 
their RVs, especially in light of the US decision to initiate ABM deployment. 
A Soviet decision to develop any particular penetration system will, of course, 
be affected by their knowledge of the nature of the ABM system the US plans 
to deploy. They have extensive experience in chaff and electronic counter-
measures ( ECM) in conjunction with aircraft defense. We believe that they 
could have exoatmospheric (above 300,000 feet) penetration aids 2 to 4 
years after starting a development program. The low ballistic coefficients 
and high observability of present Soviet RVs decrease the effectiveness of 
endoatmospheric (below 300,000 feet) penetration aids; a terminal decoy pro-
gram including a suitable RV would probably require at least 5 years of R&D. 
We believe that the Soviets would test penetration aids to ICBM ranges and we 
would probably detect such testing a year or two before IOC. 
28. The Soviets are probably well aware of the potential use of radiation kill 
mechanisms, and the development of RVs with increased hardening to with-
stand some nuclear effects is probably well within their capabilities. With a 
program of underground nuclear testing, the Soviets could investigate the 
response of various materials to X-rays at various energy levels in a simulated 
exoatmospheric environment and conduct development tests of new hardened 
warheads. 
29. There is no evidence that the Soviets have initiated an advanced RV pro~ 
hl'fam. However, they might, regardless of US programs, develop MRV s and 
multiple independently-targeted RVs (MIRVs), for purposes other than pene-
tration, e.g., to increase the numbers of deliverable warheads. A relatively simple 
MRV delivery capability probably could be achieved within 12 months after the 
start of flight testing. Development of either very accurate MIRVs or maneuver· 
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able RVs ( MaRVs) would involve significantly greater complications, particularly 
in guidance and control; operational capabilities could probably be achieved 
about 2 to 3 years after flight testing began. We would expect to detect any of 
these developments during the flight test phase. 
30. If the Soviets undertake early implementation of a MIRV program, we 
think the SS-9 would be the most likely carrier because of its large payload 
capability. An SS-9 MIRV system, capable of attacking soft targets, could be 
attained by 1969; its development would require about a year of flight testing, 
which we would expect to detect. We consider it unlikely that this program 
would be undertaken in light of the substantial capability for attacking soft 
targets represented by the SS-11 ICBM deployment. To give the SS-9 a MIRV 
capability against hard targets would require the development of some method 
for accurately delivering several independent RVs having a combined weight 
of about 9,000 pounds. Accuracy would be the pacing item and would prob-
ably require improvements in boost-phase guidance and the addition of a radio 
midcourse correction system. Even if such a MIRV program were to be initiated 
in the very near future, we doubt that IOC could be achieved before 1972. We 
would expect to detect testing of such a system 2 to 3 years prior to its 
IOC. Development of a MaRV would take at least as long. 
E. Force levels and Composition 1970-1977 
31. Soviet decisions as to the best mix of weapons and the proper force levels 
have become increasingly difficult, not only because of the growing complexity 
of the threat they face, but also because of the broadening range of options open 
to Soviet planners. The size and composition of Soviet strategic forces in the 
1970's are most likely to reflect a compromise which will embody several of the 
options now open to Soviet planners. The most likely effect of such a compromise 
on ICBM programs would be a shift in emphasis from numbers to qualitative 
improvements-though this would not necessarily preclude additional deploy-
ment. Thus, although the Soviets could deploy several thousand ICBM 
launchers by the rnid-1970's, we do not believe that they will seek a substantial 
numerical superiority. 
32. In estimating the size of the ICBM force for the 1970's, we must use a 
fairly wide range rather than a precise figure-particularly since, for a period 
so far ahead, much will depend on the interplay between US and Soviet deci-
sions taken in the interim. The low end of the range represents the minimum 
figure that can be postulated on the basis of our present evidence. We think 
that ICBM forces falling anywhere within the ranges estimated below would meet 




JOP ~ECREL 13 
33. We estimate that the Soviet ICBM force will number something more than 
1,000, but is not likely to exceed 1,300 launchers by mid-1972; by mid-1977 we 
estimate a force numbering more than 1,000, but not exceeding 1,500 launchers. 
A force near the low side, say 1,100, would reflect a deliberate Soviet decision, 
for political reasons, to hold the number of launchers at a level about equal to 
that of the us.-• It would imply some phaseout of older missiles. It would 
also imply a Soviet decision to emphasize qualitative improvements rather than 
a simple increase in numbers of launchers. If they opt for the low side, the 
single-silo launchers for the SS-9 and SS-11 would continue to make up the bulk 
of the force. A new solid-propellant ICBM would probably be brought into 
service in the next few years. A new large, liquid-propellant ICBM may also 
be deployed in hard single silos sometime later in the period. The Soviets will 
probably undertake qualitative improvements to increase weapon effectiveness 
and to counter US ABM defenses; such improvements could include better ac-
curacy, more sophisticated RVs, penetration aids, MRVs, or MIRVs. 
34. A force toward the high side of our estimate would have many of the 
features of the smaller force, including the qualitative improvement of existing 
systems. It would, by the latter part of the period, include some 700 new 
launchers, requiring a deployment program roughly comparable in size to the 
current SS-9 and SS-11 programs combined. It would probably also involve 
retention of the SS-7 hard launchers for several years and the introduction of 
one or more new ICBM systems. Deployment on this scale would consist pri-
marily of small ICBMs deployed in single silos; some of the deployment may be 
in mobile launchers. 
Ill. MILITARY APPLICATIONS IN SPACE 
35. Throughout the period of the estimate the Soviets will experiment with 
a variety of space systems which could be used for military purposes. New 
military space applications will he introduced as Soviet technology advances 
and as requirements for such systems arc developed. The high priority evident 
in the reconnaissance satellite program wil1 probably be extended to other se-
lected military support systems which the Soviet leaders decide are essential; 
these will probably include systems for improved communications, weather ob-
servation, and navigation. 
36. Evidence of Soviet interest in orbital bombardment systems dates from 
Khrushchev's remarks in early 1962 and subsequent references to "global rockets" 
and "orbital missiles." These can be interpreted to refer to either or both of two 
concepts which have come to be called "fractional orbit bombardment system" 
•For the position of Maj . Gen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 





(FOBS) and "multiple orbit bombardment system" (MOBS ).5 Actual flight 
testing of what we believe to be hardware for a FOBS began in December 1965 
and is continuing.0 These tests involve a developmental vehicle which we 
designate the SS-X-6; it uses the first two stages of the SS-9 ICBM as the launch 
vehicle. 
37. All of these orbital tests have been fired in an easterly direction, giving 
them the advantage of the earth's rotation to achieve orbital velocities. In order 
to attack targets in the US on the initial orbit, however, a FOBS would have 
to be launched on a northerly or southerly azimuth, depriving it of this ad-
vantage. Hence, any system so employed must be capable of achieving orbital 
velocity on these azimuths. There are some uncertainties about this system, 
particularly as regards the SS-9 launch vehicle, but in the configuration tested 
so far it does not achieve the necessary velocity. To do so, it would require 
additional thrust. Hence, if it is to be used as a FOBS, it would probably have to 
be modified, either through a reduction in the weight placed in orbit, or through 
an increase in the capability of the launch vehicle. If the Soviets choose to 
reduce the weight, the modification would probably be relatively simple and 
the system could probably be ready for operational deployment by early to 
mid-1968. If, on the other hand, they elect to improve the SS-9 launch vehicle, 
the system would probably not be ready for deployment until late 1968 or early 
1969. A third alternative would be for them to go for an entirely new launch 
system; if they do this, we would expect to see a series of tests extending over 
a year or two, and the system would probably not be ready for deployment 
before 1969. 
38. In the present state of the art, a FOBS would be more complex and less 
accurate than an ICBM. Moreover, it would deliver a smaller payload than an 
ICBM employing the same booster. Nevertheless, the degree of effort going 
6 
FOBS is used to designate a system deployed on the ground, targeted prior to launch, and 
launched with intent to attack. Its operational and control requirements would be like those 
for an ICBM except for the requirement for a vehicle to place a warhead in a temporary orbit 
and deorbit it on target. In practice, such a vehicle would probably be targeted to attack 
on the first orbit but it could be allowed to travel several orbits without altering the basic 
concept. MOBS is used to designate a system deployed in orbit, launched with no immediate 
commitment to attack, targeted after launch, and retargeted as necessary. It would require 
command and control links between ground control centers and orbiting vehicles; hence it 
would be much more complex than either an ICBM or a FOBS. MOBS vehicles could have 
useful orbital lifetimes of a few days to one or more years. Both a FOBS and a MOBS 
could be developed without violating the space treaty. The deployment of a MOBS would 
be a violation of the treaty. 
0 
The geometry of the early tests suggested development of a depressed trajectory ICBM 
( DICBM). Subsequent evidence leads us to believe that they were testing reorientation 
and deorbit components for a FOBS. A FOBS can perform essentially the same function 
as a DICBM (i.e., reduce the amount of warning that the US BMEWS can provide), but 
would have greater flexibility since it could attack the US from the south as well as from 
the north. 
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into this program and the record of successful launches in recent months indicate 
that the Soviets see certain advantages in such a system. A FOBS would prob-
ably be intended to delay or negate US early warning ( EW) and to attack soft, 
time urgent targets (such as SAC alert bases). The Soviets may also consider 
that it would complicate US ABM defenses. In no previous case has the USSR 
tested a long-range missile system as much as it has the SS-X-6, and then aban-
doned it without operational deployment; hence we believe that the chances are 
better than even that the Soviets will deploy a FOBS within the next few years. 
If they do, it will probably be in relatively small numbers. Considering that the 
SS-X-6 uses the SS-9 ICBM booster and it therefore may be adaptable for deploy-
ment in SS-9 silos, we might not be able to detect and identify FOBS deployment 
as such. 
39. There is no identified program which indicates that the Soviets are de-
veloping a MOBS. Much of the space technology and hardware currently being 
tested by the Soviets could be used as a basis for development of such a system, 
but it would also require the development of several new components, including 
a long-life power source and an attitude reference system. For the foreseeable 
future, we think that a MOBS would not compare favorably with ICBMs in 
terms of effectiveness, reliability, vulnerability, average life, and susceptibility 
to loss of control from accident or countermeasures. Having agreed to the 
treaty on peaceful uses of space, the Soviet leadership probably would recognize 
that the deployment of a nuclear-armed orbital bombardment system would entail 
serious political consequences. They would also be concerned that it would 
give a strong new stimulus to US military programs. In view of these factors 
and the much greater cost of such orbital weapons, we believe that the Soviets 
are unlikely to deploy a MOBS in space during the period of this estimate. 
IV. MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES 
A. Force Levels and Composition 
40. The Soviet MRBM/IRBM force of more than 700 launchers poses a massive 
threat to targets in Eurasia, especially Europe. About 90 percent of the force 
is deployed in a wide belt extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The 
balance of the force is deployed in the Far East, with a scattering of sites in 
the Caucasus and an isolated facility on the Chukotsk Peninsula apparently 
targeted against Alaska. 
41. We estimate that the MRBM/IRBM force is comprised of some 600 
launchers for the 1,020 n.m. SS-4 and about 100 launchers for the 2,400 n.m. SS-5. 
The force is predominantly soft; we estimate that some 130-140 launchers are 
in hard sites. We continue to e.11timate that they have the same design over-
pressure of 200-400 psi as hard ICBM sites (see paragraph 14). We believe 
that the soft launchers have a refire capability but that the hard launchers do not. 
i 
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42. There are also about 100 fixed field sites located at or near MRBM com-
plexes, which originally were probably intended for use as training sites or as 
alternate launch sites. Soviet documents of 1960-1961 discussed the use of alter-
nate sites for refire purposes after an initial salvo from the primary site. We 
believe that most of these alternate sites have been inactive for 2 years or more. 
Whatever their original purpose, we doubt that they now figure in strategic plans 
for use of the force. 
I 
43. We foresee little change in the size or makeup of the MRBM/IRBM force 
through mid-1969. By mid-1969, any new missiles in this category are likely to 
have entered service only in small numbers, and their introduction would prob-
ably be accompanied by a phaseout of some of the older missiles. 
B. MRBM/IRBM Research and Development 
44. Flight testing of a new medium-range missile, '--------- ---' 
began on 9 September 1966. Recent evidence indicates that this missile 
~1~s -m,.---.-'ended to be a naval weapon, probably associated with the new ballistic 
missile submarine (see Section V below); but it may also be intended to replace 
the SS-4 MRBM. The test program has been rapid and successful; there have 
been 13 shots at Kapustin Yar, 10 of which reached the 1,050 n.m. impact area. 
The most recent test was conducted on the Northern Fleet missile test range, 
probably to well over 1,000 n.m. There is some indication that increased ac-
curacy is a goal! I Available data indicates that the[:=Jprobably 
uses storable liquid propellants and an inertial guidance system. We believe 
that this system could reach IOC in 1968. If the II is intended for only 
naval use, we believe that the Soviets will develop a ne~M system to replace 
the SS-4. This new system could be either a solid or liquid-propellant missile. 
45. We have noted above the I I program, which we believe is di-
rected to development of a solid-propellant ICBM. The course of this program, 
however, particularly the shorter range firings, suggests that it could also involve 
the development of solid-pro ellant missiles of MRBM or IRBM range. Whether 
this has been an objective rogram or not, the size and scope of 
the Soviet effort in the solid-propellant field lead us to estimate that the Soviets 
will deploy a solid-pro ellant IRBM within the period of this estimate. If it is 
an outgrowth of the rogram, it could probably reach IOC in 1969. 
46. On several occasions the Soviets have displayed two types of mobile trans-
porter-erector-launch vehicles with the Scamp and Scrooge missiles. These are 
not operational systems, but they reflect continuing Soviet interest in mobility. 
We believe that some future MRBM/IRBM systems will be deployed in a mobile 
configuration. Detection of a mobile system in the development phase would be 
very difficult, however, and we might not identify the new system until it had 
been deployed in considerable numbers. 
__ IOP ~ECRE+:. 
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C. Force Levels and Composition in 1970-1977 
47. We estimate that new MRBM and IRBM systems will supersede present 
systems within the next 10 years~- \Ve cannot determine whether these new 
systems will be based on th~ }rograms, discussed above. Apart 
from these, we have observed no flight tests of a possible follow-on MRBM or 
IRBM. A new system could probably enter service about 2 years after Hight 
testing began. In any case, we doubt that a new system could achieve IOC 
before 1969. Initial deployment would probably be in hard single silos; solid-
propellant missiles may also be deployed in a mobile mode. 
48. We do not believe that old systems will be replaced by new systems on 
a one for one basis. As the survivability and overall capability of the force are 
increased by the introduction of the new systems, there will probably be some 
reduction in the total size of force. The reduction in numbers is not likely to 
be great, however, since the Soviets will probably see new requirements as the 
result of the threat from a hostile China, with its emerging strategic capabilities. 
For these reasons we estimate that the strength of the Soviet MRBM /IRBM 
force will fall somewhere within a range of 500-700 launchers throughout the 
period of this estimate. 
V. MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCES 
49. The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force is composed of 37-38 sub-
marines with a total of about 105-110 launchers. This represents an increase 
in the size of the force of one or two units (of the nuclear-powered H-class) 
over our previous estimate.7 The new figure reflects reanalysis of the H-class 
conversion program rather than new production. The USSR also has 52-57 
cruise-missile submarines equipped with some 300-330 launchers. 
50. We continue to believe the ballistic missile submarine force is intended 
for use against land targets, and that cruise-missile submarines have a primary mis-
sion of countering naval forces, particularly aircraft carrier task forces. Cruise-
missile submarines could be employed against land targets, but with the growth 
of the ICBM force and the introduction of a new class of ballistic missile sub-
marine, we believe that the Soviet requirement for such employment becomes 
increasingly marginal. 
A. Ballistic Missile Submarines 
51. The Soviets are clearly placing increasing emphasis on their ballistic missile 
rnbmarine force. They are building a new class of submarines which we believe 
is nuclear powered and will carry 16 ballistic missiles. We estimate that the 
first unit of this new class will reach IOC by mid-1968. A second submarine 
in this class probably is in the early stages of fitting out. 
1 Memornnclum to Holders of NIE 11-8-66, dated 13 March 1967. 
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52. We have estimated that the Soviets will develop a new ballistic missile 
with a range of 1,000-2,000 n.m. for this subma_rine ~lass. We have noted above 
(paragraph 44) the evidence indicating that I J is being developed to 
meet such a requirement. Our evidence is inconclusive as to its range, but it 
clea_!Jy_ e~ceeds 1,000 n.m. and may be as much as 1,500 n.m. We believe that 
thd system will soon be ready for fitting into the new submarine and that 
the entire system-submarine and missile-will reach IOC by about mid-1968. 
53. In addition to new submarine construction, we believe that the Soviets are 
continuing to retrofit G- and H-class submarines with the SS-N-5 submerged-
launch 700 n.m. missiles. These submarines were initially equipped with the 
350 n.m. surface-launched SS-N-4 ballistic missile. Some 12 to 14 of these sub-
marines have probably been modified or are undergoing modification at the 
present time. We expect these modification programs to continue until all of 
the H-class and most of the G-class have undergone retrofit. 
B. Cruise-Missile Submarines 
54. Soviet cruise-missile submarines became operational sometime after the 
initial ballistic missile units. We believe that production of the nuclear-powered 
E-II and the J-class of cruise-missile submarines is continuing, although produc-
tion of the E-II class has probably been considerably reduced. We expect pro-
duction of both to end within the next few years, since it appears that the force 
is approaching what we believe to be its planned level. We do not believe the 
Soviets will develop any new cruise-missile submarines, but they may develop 
a new cruise missile with increased range and speed to replace their present 
type. All Soviet cruise-missile submarines are equipped with the SS-N-3. We 
believe this missile could be fired to a maximum range of 450 n.m., but that its 
likely operational range would be on the order of 250 n.m. 
C. Strength and Composition of the Force to 1969 
55. Our estimate of the strength and composition of the Soviet missile sub-
marine force through mid-1969 is shown below. 
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 
NUMBER OF 
LAUNCHERS 1 OCTOBER 
CLASS PER UmT 1967 
Nuclear Powered 
l-I-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
H-II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
New Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Diesel Powered 
G-I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
G-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Z-Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 





























BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (Continued) 
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES 
Nuclear Powered 
E-I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
E-II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Diesel Powered 
J ........... .. .. .. . . .. 4 
W-Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, or 4 
TOTAL Cruise . . . . ....... . 

















56. Open ocean patrols by both ballistic and cruise-missile submarines were 
first noted in 1964, increased sharply in 1966, and have continued during 1967. 
What we believe to be ballistic missile submarines carried out eight patrols in 
the North Atlantic in 1965 and about 15 in 1966. The number has declined 
in 1967, probably because of the extensive retrofit program. In 1965 all such 
patrols were conducted in an area southeast of Greenland, but in 1966 a new area 
was established northeast of the Azores. Since early 1966 patrols in these areas 
have been carried out by diesel-powered submarines, probably G-class. Those 
near Greenland are probably targeted against naval installations in the UK, 
such as the Polaris base at Holy Loch and the British ballistic missile submarine 
base nearby, and against bases in Iceland. Patrols near the Azores are probably 
targeted against the Polaris base at Rota, Spain, and the important airbase at 
Lajes in the Azores. 
57. In the Pacific, individual patrols continue to be conducted northeast of 
Hawaii, normally by diesel submarines, probably G-class. This is probably a 
holding area from which submarines would deploy to launch positions off Hawaii 
or the west coast of the US. 
58. Patrols by cruise-missile submarines have been maintained at a high level 
since 1966. A patrol area west of the Azores is now continuously manned by 
at least one nuclear-powered submarine probably an E-II; the location astride 
the great-circle routes between the US and Europe suggests that their principal 
mission is to intercept US carrier forces at sea. 
59. We estimate that this patrol activity will increase, and that with the advent 
of the new ballistic missile submarine, additional patrol areas will be established. 
Because of the lack of forward bases and the operational limitations of the force, 
however, the Soviets probably could keep no more than about 30 percent of 
their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines continuously on station in po-
tential missile launch areas off the US. We believe that by the mid-1970's this 
will be the normal operating pattern. The Soviets may be able to maintain 
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60. Current Soviet nuclear-powered missile submarines have about the same 
operating depth limitation as US ballistic missile submarines, but are somewhat 
slower and considerably noisier. When seeking to counter US submarine de-
tection systems, the Soviets apparently use the technique of operating at slow 
speed (below 10 or 12 knots) to reduce noise levels. We believe that the new 
ballistic missile submarine incorporates features which will somewhat reduce 
the level of noise it generates. 
61. The Soviets have s'ubstantially improved the logistic and communications 
support for their submarine forces during the past several years. During the 
summer of 1967, they experimented in the central Atlantic with what appears 
to be a unique open ocean submarine support and replenishment concept, in-
volving a variety of auxiliary and support vessels. Classes of submarines sighted 
in company with one or more of the ships included the cruise-missile E-II, the 
torpedo attack N, and the torpedo attack F. At least one of the missile sub-
marines operating with this support group evidently remained at sea for about 
6 months. Should the concept prove feasible and be put into practice, it 
would greatly increase the patrol areas which submarines could cover and also 
serve, to some extent at least, as a substitute for distant land-based submarine 
support facilities. It might also permit more of the force to be continuously 
on patrol. 
E. Force Levels and Composition in 1970-1977 
62. We believe that the Soviets are building toward a ballistic missile sub-
marine force that will confront the continental US with a threat roughly com-
parable to that which the Polaris force presents to the USSR. The Soviets might 
define such comparability in terms of numbers of Polaris-type submarines, in 
terms of numbers of submarine missile launchers, or in terms of launchers that 
could be maintained continuously on station. Depending on how they define 
comparability, we believe that the Soviets would see a force of between 35 to 50 
of the new submarines, together with their H-class units, as meeting these re-
quirements. (The diesel-powered G-class submarines, because of their limited 
on-station time at long range, are probably intended primarily for use against 
Eurasian targets.) . 
63. We estimate the number of Soviet ballistic missile submarines in mid·l972 
at 45 to 55, of which 15-18 will be of the new type. By 1977 we expect the 
ballistic missile fleet to be composed of about 65-85 submarines, including about 
35-50 of the new class. All the Z-conversion models will probably be phased 
out by 1973. 
64. We estimate that the cruise-missile submarine force will number between 
50 and 60 units in 1972 and between 40 and 50 by mid.1977. The estimated 
reduction in the force is based on our belief that phaseout of the W-class con-
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VI. LONG RANGE AVIATION 8 
65. Although the ballistic missile has clearly replaced the manned bomber as 
the principal means of strategic attack, the bomber forces of Long Range Aviation 
( LRA) still represent a substantial capability for strategic strike and reconnais-
sance. We believe that Soviet planning calls for the use of LRA in attacks 
following an initial missile strike, or to supplement the retaliatory blow if the 
USSR is attacked first. LRA now comprises a force of about 200 heavy bomber/ 
tanker aircraft and about 750 medium bomber/tankers. We believe that the 
heavy bombers have the primary mission of intercontinental attack, and that the 
mediums are intended mainly for operations against Eurasia. LRA activity over 
the past year continued to reflect training for these primary missions; the secondary 
mission of naval reconnaissance received less emphasis, particularly in the me-
dium bomber force. 9 
A. Recent Developments in Long Range Aviation 
66. The most important recent development in LRA has been the equipping 
of the Badger medium bomber force with a new air-to-surface missile ( ASM) 
which will probably extend the useful life of the Badger. We believe that a 
significant portion of the Badger force has already been equipped with the new 
missile and we estimate that as many as 250-300 Badgers may carry the missile 
by the time the reequipping and training program has been completed. The 
missile, which we designate AS-5, is estimated to fly at high subsonic speed to 
a maximum range of 120 n.m. 
67. Another important new development is that the AS-4 appears finally to 
have reached operational status. During the Soviet airshow in July 1967, 19 
Blinders equipped with the AS-4 participated in the flyby. (Blinder aircraft 
configured to carry the AS-4 are designated Blinder B.) We estimate that 40-50 
Blinder B aircraft have been delivered to LRA. 
8 Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, considers 
that this section does not adequately address present and future capabilities of Soviet Long 
Range Aviation and seriously underestimates the manned aircraft threat to the US. He 
believes this threat involves more than 400 aircraft-including about 300 medium bombers 
on range missions-and that a threat of this magnitude will continue well into the future. 
His specific disagreements with this section of the estimate are explained in footnotes to 
the appropriate paragraphs below. 
9 
Maj. Gen. Thomas believes that the USSR would commit the majority of its medium 
bombers, as well as the entire heavy bomber force, against the US, rather than use the 
mediums mainly against Eurasia. It is his view that the greater number of essential and 
desirable targets in the US, as compared with the number in Eurasia, poses a requirement that 
the medium bombers be focused against North America. Even without the medium bombers, 
the USSR possesses a massive capability against Eurasian targets with MRBM/IRBMs, shorter 
range missiles, light bombers and tactical fighters, as well as bombers of Naval Aviation and 
the cruise-missile submarines. 
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B. Aircraft Production 
68. The Bear and the Blinder are the only strategic bomber aircraft now in 
production. Plant 18 at Kuybyshev is producing about one Bear per month, 
but we estimate that since 1964 most, if not all, of the Bear aircraft produced 
have gone to Naval Aviation. We believe that within the next year the require-
ments of Naval Aviation for Bears will be met. We think production will then 
cease; if some kind of program in connection with the Bear does continue at 
this plant, its purpose would probably be to effect qualitative improvements such 
as adapting the Bear for a new ASM or, conceivably, to replace some aging 
aircraft. We believe that Plant 22 at Kazan is continuing to produce about 3-4 
Blinders per month; we are uncertain as to how long this production will continue 
but we doubt that it will extend longer than about 2 years.10 
C. Force Levels and Composition to Mid-1969 
69. The strength of LRA has remained relatively stable over the past year. 
We believe the Soviets will retain their heavy bomber force at close to the 
present level for the next few years. The medium bomber force will probably 
decline somewhat. Our estimate of the strength and composition of LRA through 
mid-1969 is as follows: 
I OCTOBER 1967 
Heavy Bombers/Tankers 
Bison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90-95 
Bear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110-115 
Medium Bombers/Tankers u 
Badger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600-625 
Blinder . . .. . ......... . . . . . . .... 125-140 











70. A review of LRA training activity over the past several years strongly 
indicates that an aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would be carried 
out almost exclusively by heavy bombers and that the Soviets would use virtually 
their entire force of heavy bombers and tankers for that mission. 
10 Maj. Gen. Thomas does not consider there is adequate basis for a judgment that Bear 
and Blinder production will end in 1 or 2 years, unless it is accepted that the Soviet 
Union already is preparing to produce follow-on models. He believes that Soviet efforts 
to modernize the long range, manned-aircraft capability, as evidenced by limited, but con-
tinuing, production of Bear and Blinder, probably will continue until the USSR has decided 
upon specific follow-on models. 
11 Maj. Gen. Thomas expe<:ts that any reduction in the medium-bomber force over the next 
two years will be very minor, and not nearly as much as the 90-125 aircraft reduction indicated 
in the table. He notes that in the past year total reduction in the medium-bomber force W<\'l 
only five aircraft. 
-
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71. We continue to believe that medium bombers do not figure prominently 
in Soviet plans for an initial attack on the US. To carry out two-way missions 
against US targets, they would require Arctic staging and aerial refueling. Fur-
thermore, we believe that the Arctic staging bases, which must be supplied almost 
entirely by sea during the short annual shipping seasons, could not simultaneously 
support heavy bomber and medium bomber strikes of major size. A few squad-
rons of Badgers might be employed on two-way missions against targets in Alaska, 
Canada, Iceland, and Greenland.12 
72. The Soviets could, if they elected to do so, increase the weight of an attack 
against the US by utilizing a portion of the medium bomber force on range 
(one-way) missions, since the aircraft do have the capability. Considering 
training patterns, as well as the growth of the ICBM and submarine missile forces, 
we believe such use of the medium bomber is unlikely.12 
73. We believe that LRA does not continuously maintain a portion of its force 
on an airborne or ground alert (i.e., with a reaction time of 15 minutes or less). 
We estimate that with current manning, LRA could establish and maintain one-
third of the force on ground alert; with a slight augmentation in personnel this 
could be raised to 50 percent. We believe that, if LRA were to establish a 
ground alert status on a routine basis, this would be detected. 18 
E. New Aircraft Development 
7 4. Our evidence indicates that Soviet work in large aircraft is directed pri-
marily toward the development of new transports. This work advances the 
state of the art and provides a technological and production base which could 
be applied to bomber development. The US announcement to deploy ABM 
defenses may lead the Soviets to consider a new manned bomber as a response 
to such defenses. If the Soviets did elect to develop a new heavy bomber, we 
probably would obtain indications of the development and production of such 
an aircraft 3 to 4 years prior to its introduction into operational units. 
Considering the growing of Soviet ballistic missile capabilities, however, and 
the other options open to them to counter ABM defenses, we continue to believe 
tJ Maj. Gen. Thomas believes that because of their range and weapon carrying capabilities, 
and in view of the large number of US targets as against the number of Soviet delivery vehicles, 
medium bombers continue to have a major mission of attack against the US if a major nuclear 
assault is launched. In such a situation, he estimates more than 300 medium bombers would 
be used on range missions. 
j;I Maj. Gen. Thomas docs not consider available information is sufficient to provide basis 
for judgment that the LRA does not maintain a portion of the force on ground alert. In 
view of Soviet doctrinal emphasis on alert readiness, he considers it likely that some portion 




it unlikely that the USSR will introduce a follow-on heavy bomber into LRA 
during the period of this estimate.1-1 
75. The Soviets have experienced difficulties in bringing the Blinder to opera-
tional status. Unless these problems have been resolved, the Soviets may elect 
to develop a follow-on medium bomber. One possibility is a supersonic-dash 
aircraft, perhaps with variable geometry wings, having better speed, altitude, 
and radius than the Blinder; it could be introduced in the 1972-1975 period. 
An alternate possibility, which could be introduced somewhat later than the 
dash model, would be a supersonic-cruise medium bomber based on the Soviet 
supersonic transport development; it would probably have a radius about the 
same as the Blinder. 
F. New Air-to-Surface Missile Development 
76. The Soviets are continuing developmental work on ASMs for attack against 
both land and sea targets. Even though the AS-3, now carried by two models of 
the Bear, has been operational since 1960, we believe that the Soviets are still 
trying to improve the weapon. The most likely component to be improved would 
be the guidance system. It is also possible that the Soviets will develop a new 
ASM for use with the Bear. 
77. We believe that the Soviets are working on an ASM with a range of about 
350 n.m. and a cruise speed of Mach 3. We think it unlikely, however, that it 
has achieved IOC, but the program is probably continuing. 
G. Future Force Levels 
78. The LRA heavy bomber aircraft are on the average about 8 years 
old and attrition is beginning to take effect. The strength of the Bear force has 
not changed appreciably during the past 2 or 3 years, but the number of 
Bisons has declined. We estimate that over the next 5 years or so the number 
of Bear ASM carriers will remain relatively constant but that overall heavy 
bomber strength will decline, due to attrition of the older Bear and Bison free-fall 
bombers. We estimate that by mid-1972 the heavy bomber force will be com-
prised of 70-90 Bear ASM carriers and some 65-80 Bisons. We estimate that 
by mid-1977 this force will consist of no more than 40-60 Bears and 30-50 Bisons.1 11 
u Maj . Gen. Thomas believes a new heavy strategic aircraft system is likely to be introcluc:ed 
to support the present force level into the mid-1970's. This follow-on system could be an 
improved Bear with a new ASM or r\ supersonic: aircraft based on resenrc:h and development 
relating, in part at least, to supersonic transports. 
u Maj. Gen. Thomas notes that both Bear and Bison strength has remained unchanged in 
the past year, and he believes that the USSR will continue to maintain about 200 heavv 
bombers In operational units throughout the period of this estimate, using a follow-on svste1;1 
to support the force level in the 1970's. · 
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79. Over the past 5 years the strength of the medium bombers in LRA 
has been declining; the Badger force has been decreasing at an average rate 
of about 70 aircraft per year and Blinders have not been deployed in sufficient 
numbers to off set this decline. Since we do not believe that all the Badgers 
now in the force will be equipped to carry the ASM, we expect a continued 
reduction in Badger strength. We estimate that by mid-1972 the medium bomber 
force will comprise some 250-325 Badgers and some 175-225 Blinders. By 1977 
the Badger force will probably have declined to some 100-200 aircraft but the 
number of Blinders will probably have remained relatively constant. If the So-
viets introduce a new medium bomber in the 1970's, we believe that it would 
replace some of the older current types rather than being additional to the 
above strengths.10 
VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
80. Supreme authority over the Soviet Armed Forces is probably vested in the 
Politburo as a whole, or at least in a committee of the Politburo. In peacetime 
the political authorities exercise control through the Ministry of Defense. In 
the event of war the channel would probably run through a Supreme High Com-
mand, which would include political as well as military leaders and would have 
wide powers in the direction of the war effort. 
81. During the past 2 years, some elements within the military have empha-
sized the critical importance of fast reaction and surprise in a modern nuclear 
environment and have stressed the need for a permanent political-military com-
mand organ-apparently similar to the wartime Supreme High Command-to 
operate in peacetime as well as in wartime. We do not know whether such an 
organ has in fact been created. vV c believe that arrangements exist for the 
quick assumption of command by the political leadership in the event of emer-
gency, but we doubt that any one of the present collective leaders has been 
given the authority that Khrushchev exercised as "Supreme Commander-in-Chief." 
We believe that the collective nature of the present leadership works to inhibit 
such a centralization of command authority at this time. 
82. We believe that within the military itself, however, the Soviets are moving 
toward a highly integrated command structure for their strategic attack forces. 
There are various indications that during the past year there has been a con-
tinuing refinement and improvement of operational controls within those forces. 
16 Maj . Gen. Thomas €.''<pects a more gradual decline in the Badger force and a somewhat 
larger Blinder for<.'e than this paragraph indicates. He estimates a mid-1912 medium-
homber force of 625-725 (rather than the 425-550 in pnragraph 79) and a mid-1977 force 
of 400-600 (rather than 275-425). 
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GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS 
Initial Operational Capability ( IOC )-Date the first operational unit is trained 
and equipped with a few missiles and launchers. 
MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (N.M.) 
Air-to-Surface Systems-Slant range between launching aircraft and target at 
the time of missile launch. 
Surface-to-Surface Systems-Maximum range under operational conditions 
with warhead weight indicated. In the case of ballistic missiles the maximum 
range figures disregard the effect of the earth's rotation. 
ACCURACY 
Circular Error Probability ( CEP)-The radius of a circle centered on the 
extended target, within which 50 percent of the arriving missile warheads are 
expected to fall. 
FOBS AND MOBS-See footnote definition on page 14. 
REENTRY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS 
Reentry Vehicle ( RV)-That part of a missile designed to reenter the earth's 
atmosphere in the terminal portion of its trajectory. 
Multiple RVs (MRVs)-A payload package consisting of two or more RVs. 
The individual RVs are dispersed (but not independently-targeted or maneu-
vered) during the free flight or terminal portion of the trajectory in order to 
confuse enemy radars, aid penetration, and/ or to increase kill area. 
Multiple Independently-targeted RV (MIRV)-A payload consisting of two 
or more RVs each of which is independently targeted. 
Maneuverable RV ( MaRV)-An RV which has the capability to maneuver 
during free flight or reentry. 
Warhead Weight-The weight of the explosive device and its associated fuzing 
and firing mechanism. 
RV Weight-RV weight includes that of the warhead, necessary shielding and 
structure, any internal penetration aids that may be present, and any other 
necessary or desired components. 
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RANGE CLASSES 
Short Range Ballistic Missile ( SRB M) 
Up to about 600 n.m. 
Medium Range Ballistic Missile ( MRBM) 
About 600 to 1,500 n.m. 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ( IRBM) 
About 1,500 to 3,000 n.m. 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
Over 3,000 n.m. 
RELIABILITIES 
Weapon System-The percentage of the alert missiles that will successfully 
detonate within 3.5 CEPs of their targets. This is the product of launch, inflight, 
and warhead reliabilities. 
Alert Rate--The percentage of the operational missile force that is maintained 
at normal readiness condition. 
Force--The percentage of the operational missile force that will successfully 
detonate in the target area. This is the product of Alert Rate and Weapon 
System reliability. 
Reaction Time--Time required to proceed from a readiness condition to launch. 
















SOVIET ICBM SYSTEMS 
Estimated Chara.cteristics and Performance 
SS-6 SS-7 SS-8 I SS-9 I SS-11* SS-Small SS-Large Follow-on** Follow-on** 
roe .. . ..... ...... ... . ... . . . ... 1960 1962 1963 1966 1966 Mid-1969 1970-1972 
Operational Range-NRE-(nm) . ... 6,000 5,00~6,000 6,000 5,000-6,500 5,500 About 5,000 6 ,500 
Reentry Vehicle Weight (lbs) . .. .. 7,()()(}-9,000 4,200±500. 3,000-4,000 12,500± 1, 000. 1,500±300 About 1,500 10,000-15,000 
3,500±500. 10,000± 1,000 
W arhend Weight (lbs) . . . . .. .. .. . 5,()()(}-7,000 3 1 300/2 I 800 2,400-3,200 10' 000/8' 000 1,100±300 About 1,000 8,000-12,000 
...L.4.00/±400 ± 1,000/ ± 1,000 J lo 
lJ..h;P (nm) . ............. .. .. . ... 2.0 l.0-1.5 1.0 u.:ru.-1:> 0 l. 0-1.;) aoou-V-1 u.o 
lmprovement/Y ear .... .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.25/1972 
Weapon System Reliability ( %) .. 75 75 75 75 75 . . . . 
Alert Rate (% of Force) . . .... . .. 80 80 c 80 c 85 85 .. . . 
Force Reliability (Rounded) (%) . . 60 60 e 60 c 65 65 About 50 About 60 
Improvement/Year . ....... . ... .. . . . . . . . . 60/IOC+2 yrs 65/IOC+2 yrs. 
Deployment ... . ....... .. ... . ... Soft Soft & Hard Soft & Hard Hard Hard Hard; possibly Hard 
mobile later 
Time to Fire F'rom Normal Rea.di- At least 12 hrs 1-3 5-15 1-3 30-45 3-5 0.5-3 About 1 min About 1 min 
ness Condition. hrs min hrs min min min 
Time to Fire From Peak Readi- 5-10 min 3-5 3-5 5-10 5-10 3-5 0.5-3 About 1 min About 1 min 
ness. min min min min min min 
Hold Time (at Peak Readiness) . . . About 1 hr Many Days About 1 hr Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
hours 
Retire Time .. . ... . ..... .. .. ... . At leaat 12 hrs 2-4 na 2-4 na na na na na 
hrs hrs' 




Propella.n t . . ... . .. . . ..... . .. .. .. N onstorable Storable N onstora.ble Storable Liquid Storable Solid Storable Liquid 
Liquid Liauid Liauid Liauid 
*Over the next few years, the Soviets will probably improve the SS-11 system, and in the mid-1970's they may elect to replace it with a new small 
liquid-propellant ICBM. 
** This is the ICBM associated with the KY-6 program. 
•These ICBMs have been tested to different ranges using different weight warheads. 
b Using only inertial guidance, the SS-9 would have an estimated CEP of about 1 n.m. 
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TABLE II 
SOVIET FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM• 
Estimated Characteristics and Performance 
IOC . ... ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1968-1969 
Reentry Vehicle Weight (lbs) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000-4,000 • 
j' Wa.r~ead We~ht (lbs) . . .;..:.-:...: ..... _ .. . ,_._ J-~~4~~-· - · __ 2:400-3'.200 • {,,. l (A) 
-- n •-- - •-= J 
CEP (nm). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 b 
Deployment .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hard 
Force Reliability (percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
Improvement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 (2 years after IOC) 
Reaction Time 
Normal Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 minutes 
Peak Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Same 
Hold Time. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unlimited 
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inertial 
Propellant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Storable Liquid 
• This is an estimate of a FOBS based on the SS-X- 6 system which the Soviets have been 
testing for almost 2 years. Evidence indicates that the SS-X- 6, us it has been test<·<l to dnu~, 
would probably hnve to be modified to attack the US on a polar trajectory. If the modifica-
tion were merely a reduction of weight in orbit, roe could be achieved by early to mid-1968 
and the lower RV and warhead weights would apply. If the modification were to be so 
drastic ll.S the development of a new launch vehicle, roe could not be achieved before 1969 
but the higher RV and warhead weights could be delivered. If the modification were to be 
an improvement in the thrust of the present launch vehicle, the higher RV and warhead 
weights would apply but roe could not be achieved until late 1968 or early 1969. 
b If the FOBS were to be launched on a North Pole trajectory, we estimate that its CEP 
would be about 1- 2 n.m. If it were to be lnunchcd on n South Pole trajectory, we estimate 
that its CEP would be about 1.5- 3 n.m. 
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TABLE III 
SOVIET MRBM/IRBM SYSTEMS 
Estimated Characteristics and Performance 
Ss-4 SS-5 Follow-on MRBM* Follow-on IRBM 
roe . . . .. .............. . .. . .... .. . . ...... .. . .. 1958 1961 1968- 1969 1969-1971** 
Maximum Operational Range-NRE-(nm) .... . .. .. 1,020 About 1,500 2,000-:1,000 
Reentry Vehicle Weight (lbs) .... . ..... . . ... ... . .. 3,300 3,500 About 2,000 About 1,500 2.·~n 
Warhead Weight (lbs) .......... . .. . ... . .... .. 2.200 2 800 About 1,500 - ··. A hon t 1 ,.O.QQ .. 
L - - -~ =----==-=-==-r-- -- -----,-------···-~ .. :-,-~_J-- ~ 
v~r lilIIl) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J...-a 1.0 0.5-1.0 About 1.5 
Reliability (%) 
Weapon System H.eliability (%-Rounded) .. . . . . . 75 • 75 • 
% of Force on Alert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 80 
Force Reliability (3-Rouuded)... .. .. . . . . . . . . . . 60 • 60 • About 60 55-60 
Improvement/Yet~r ........ . ........... . . .. . . . About 65/IOC+2 yrs 65/IOC + 2 yrs 
Deployment .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soft/Ha.rd Soft/Hard Hard; possibly mobile Hard; possibly mobile 
Time to Fire From Normal Readiness Condition . .. . 1-3 hrs/5-15 min 1-3 hrs/5-15 min About 1 min About 1 min 
Time to Fire From Peak Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 min/3-5 min 3-5 min/3-5 min About 1 min About 1 min 
Hold Time nt Peak Headiness ...... .. ... . . .. . . . . . Mauy hrs/days Many hrs/days Unlimited Unlimited 
Retire Time. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4 hrs/na 2-4 hrs/na na na 
Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial 
Propellant .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Storable Liquid Storable Liquid Storable Liouid Solid or Storable Liquid 
* This mi:)Silc system is an estimate based on testing of the~ I Recent evidence suggests that the llis for use in the new ballistic missile sub-
marines. It may, however, ulso be deployed as an MRBM. If'theJ !is not intended for use as an M~we believe that the Soviets will develop a 
· new MRBM to replace the SS-4. It would probably reach IOC later in the period and it could be either a solid or liquid-propelln.nt type. It could be 
deployed in either hard or mobile configuration. 
**We estimate that a. new IR.BM will be brought to operational status during the period of this estimate. If such a missile is developed a.s an out-
growth of it probably could reach IOC in 1969. If, on 'the other hand, it is a new system which has not yet been flight tested, IOC 
could probably not be reached until 1970-1971. 
• May be somewhat higher in hard sites. 
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TABLE IV 
SOVIET BALLISTIC :MISSILE SUBMARINES 
Estimated Characteristics aud Performance 
Cltiss H-I H- II ~ew Class G-I G-II Z-Conver-
sion 
Type of Propulsion ....... . .......... . . Nuclear Nuclear Nuclear Diesel Diesel Diesel 
Type of Missile ..... . ................. SS-N- 4 SS-N-5 SSN-Follow-on SS-N-4: SS-N-5 SS-N-4 
Speed (KTS) 
Maximum Surface ....... . ...... .. . 20 20 16 18 18 18 
Maximum Snorkel. ........... . ...... na na na 10.5 10.5 7 
Maximum Submerged/Endurance (KTS/ 
nm) .. . . ..... . ................. . . . .. 20/na 20/na About 20/na 16/12 16/12 15/15 
Economic Submerged/Endurance (KTS/ 
nm) ... ... .................... .... .. . . . . . . 3. 5/175 3.5/175 3/150 
Armament 
Torpedoes ..... . .. . .......... . .. .. .. 32 32 32 26 26 26 
Missiles ... . ..... . .................. 3 3 16 3 3. 2 
Patrol Duration (do.ys) b . •. ••.. . • . .• . • • 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Days on Station/Distance (nm) ... . .. . .. 0/8' 600 0/8, 600 0/8, 600 0/3' 600 0/3' 600 0/3,600 
10/7' 200 10/7' 200 10/7' 200 10/3' 000 10/3' 000 10/3' 000 
20/5' 800 20/5,800 20/5, 800 20/2, 400 20/2' 100 20/2,400 
• The first submarine of the G-II class was equipped to carry only two SS-N-5 missiles. Later models, however, are 
equipped to carry three. 
b Patrol durntion is defined !l.8 the normal length of time that a submarine can remain at sea under combat conditions 
without replenishment. It is estimA.tcd on the basis of personnel endurance, general habitability, foocl consumption, spare 
parts, and other consumables including fuel. 
TABLE V 
SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES 
Estimated Characteristics and Performance 
Cln.s1:1 E- I E-II J W- Long Bin W-Twin 
Cylinder 
Type of Propulsion . . .. ............... . . . .. . .. Nuclear Nuclear Diesel Dies~} Diesel 
Type of Missile ... ....... ' . . ....... . ....... SS- N- 3 SS-N-3 SS-N- 3 SS-N- 3 SS-N-3 
Speed (KTS) 
Maximum Surface .. .. .. . .................. 20 20 16 18 18 
Maximum Snorkel . ............. . .......... na na 9 .3.5 5.5 
Maximum Submerged/Endurn.nce (KTS/nm) ' .. 20/na 20/na 16/12 12/12 12/12 
Economic Submerged/Endurance (KTS/nm) ..... .. . . 3/150 2.5/125 2. 5/125 
Armament 
Torpedoes . . . . ................ . ........... . 32 32 26 12 14 
Missiles . ... .. . ................. .......... 6 8 4 4 2 
Patrol Duration (ctn.ya)• ............... . ...... 60 60 60 40 40 
Days on Stn.tion/Di8tance (nm) ....... . ....... . 0/8, 600 0/8, 600 0/3' 600 0/2, 400 0/2' 400 
10/7' 200 10/7' 200 10/3, 000 10/1, 800 10/1, 800 
20/5 I 800 20/5, 800 20/2,400 20/1, 200 20/1, 200 







SOVIET SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED "MISSILE SYSTEMS 
Characteristics and Performance 
SS-N- 3 • 
IOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1961 








1 500-2 500 _ Wu..ia ..~ rhl>~ nALW..Ll..3"a;l no..,• h~, t"-l..!(' lyb...,~1 )'--""-'- _,_. _,_. ~...._,_,._,_. _,_. _,_. _,_. ,_,. _.__._~1j)QQ-2.000 . 





_ __ __ ..A,hnut 1 ~00--.(, . ~(ft) 
About l - 'CEP{Against Land Targets) (nm) . . . . . 1-2 1-2 1- 2 
Type u.nd Propulsion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cruise Turbo Jet Ballistic Storn.ble Ballistic Storable Ballistic Storable 
Speed (Mach) . . . .. . . . .... .. . .. . . ... . . 
Cruise Altitude (ft) .... . ............. . 
Launch Mode .. . .. . . . . . .. . ..... . . . . . . 






Alert Rate (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
Force Reliability (3) (Rounded) b. • . • . 70 
Guida.nee . .. ... .. . . .. ............... . 
Salvo Time by Submarine Class (min) 




J-Class ( 4 missiles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
E-I Clo.ss (6 missiles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
E-II Class (8 missiles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Z-Class (2 missiles) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
G- 1 Class (3 missiles). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
G-II Class (2 or 3 missiles) d •••• , . • . • • 
H-I Class (3 missiles). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
H- II Class (3 missiles) ...... . . . . . . . . . . 
Follow-on SSBN (16 missiles) , . . . .. . . 
Heaction Time (min) • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-40 






























About 60 (65 two 





* This missile is bMed onj I 
• We believe thn.t the SS.:.N- :f-was designed for use u.gl\inst nu.vol surface vessels but that it can be employed in the 
!'ltro.tcgic attack mis~ion against land tu.rgets. The characteristics n.nd performance du.to. given on this table are for its use 
in this latter role. Some of the performn.nce do.ta shown would be different if the system were to be employed against 
naval forces. The 4.)0 n .m. figure represents the maximum rnnge of this missile but we believe that the likely operational 
range would be on the order of 250 n.m. 
b Pertains only to submarines on patrol. 
0 There nro three vnril\nts of t.he W-class conversion in the Soviet fleet. 
J The first submarine of the G- II clni;s wn.s equipped to cn.rry only two SS-N- !is. Later models, however, are equipped 
to cnrry three missiles. 
e Time required to proceed from a. :<pecified rcu.dine1:1s condition to firing. For submarine-launched missiles, time is taken 
to include the time from the moment of the order to fire to ln.unch of the first missile :l.:lsuming: (1) the submo.rine is on 
alert; (2) targets have been :ielec~d; (3) the mis~ile Mystem includes continuous comput11tion of firing rinta, and ( 4) the missiles 
hu.ve been checked nnct are ready for countdown. For surfucc-lmmched SI~BMs submarine time on surface is included in 
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TABLE VII 
SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION BOMBER AND TANKER AIRCRAFT 
Estimated Characteristics and Performance 
J Bison Bear Badger Blinder A• Blinder B • 
Combat Radius/Range (nm) 
(As a free fall bomber) 
a. 25,000 lb. bombload . . . ..... .. ......... . . 2,800/5,200 4, 150/7,800 . . . . . . 
one refuel .... . . .. .... . ..... . . .. .. ... ... 3,950/7,300 
b. 10,000 lb. bombload . ... . . .. .. .. . ... . . . .. 3,050/5,950 4,500/8,800 1,550/2,950 1, 700/3,250 . . 
one refuel . ...... . .......... .. .......... 4,150/7,900 . . 2,200/4,150 2,350/4,500 
c. 6,600 lb. bombload .... . ... . . .. . . . ........ 3, 100/6,050 4,600/9,000 1,650/3,200 1,800/3,450 . . 
one refuel .. ....... . ...... . ...... .. .. ... 4,200/8,100 . . 2,300/4,400 2,400/4,650 
d. 3,300 lb. bombload .. ... ...... .. . . ... . ... 3, 150/6, 150 4, 700/9,300 1, 7 50/3, 400 1,850/3,650 . . 
one refuel .. .... . . . .. ... ... . . . ...... . . .. 4,250/8,250 . . 2,400/4,600 2, ;)00/ 4,800 
e. With ASM 
1. One AS-3 (Bear B&C) . .. . ............ . . . 3, 950/7I150 . . . . .. 
one refuel ... . ... . .. . .. .. . . ........ . .. . . 5,050/9,200 . . . . . . 
2. One AS-4 (Blinder B Subsonic) ......... . . . . . . . . 1,500/2,800 
one refuel . . .... . ... ................. . . . . . . . . . 2, 150/ 4, 000 
3. Two AS-5 . ...................... . . . . . . . . 1,300/2,500 . . . . 
one refuel ... ... .. ... ... . . .. . ...... .. . . . . . 1,750/3,350 . . . . 
f. 10,000 lb. bombload (Supersonic-dash) ..... . . . . . . 1,200/2,650 . . 
one refuel . . ...... . . . ............ . . .. .. . . . . . . . 1,850/3,900 . . 
6,600 lb. bomblottd (Supersonic.d11Sh) .. .... . . . . . . 1,300/2,850 . . 
one refuel ... . ..... ... ... ........ . ...... . . . . . . 1,950/4,100 . . 
3,300 lb. bombloa<l (Supertmnic-d11sh) ...... . . . . . . 1,400/3,050 . . 
one refuel . ............... . ............. . . . . . . 2,050/4,300 . . 
one AS-4 (Supersonic-da..'lh) . ... ........... . . . . . . . . 1,000/2, 100 
one refuel . . ......... .. .. . ....... . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 1,600/3,300 
Target Speed/ Altitude (KTS/ft.) .......... . ... 
Subsonic . .... . .... . ....................... 465/about 435/i~bont 475/about .560/about 560/about 
43,000 42,000 41,000 37,000 37,000 
Supersonic ................ ... ... . .. . ...... . . . . . . 860/about 860/about 
46,000 43,000 
System Reliability (3 n.ircrnft ren.ching t1irgct 
areas in North America)b ...... .. .......... 79- 85 79-85 76-85 79-85 79-85 
• Blinder A is a bomber. Blinder B is 1L mistJ ile carrier c•quipped with one AS- 4/Kitchcn missile. Blinder aircraft mis-
sions are based on a Mnch 1..i, 100 n.m. dt\sh in u.nd out of tal'get area on radius mission aucl 100 n.m. ctash in only on-
range mission. There is no direct evidence of nn operational refuel rnpability for these aircraft at pr<'stmt. 
b This range is bo.sed on the following noncom bat attrition rates : ( 1) 90 percent of the n.ircrnft t\ssigued to home base 
(AOB) would be in commis8ion after n .5- 10 day standdown prior to initiu.l operl\tionl:!, anrl would become airborne nt 
launch time; (2) 94 percent of th<• aircrnft nirbornt- would re.o.ch BRL directly from home base or from i> taging buse; (3) 9.) 
percent of the aircraft lu11nchcd from home base wonlcl be ln.unched from stl\ging base; (4) 98 percPnt reliability should bo 
applied to n.ircrn.ft. equipped for probe and drogue and requiring inflight refueling to accomplish their mis. ion. A 9.5 percent 
reliability should be applied to uircraft employing wing-tip to wing- tip refueling. 
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TABLE VIII 
SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION ASM SYSTEMS 
Estimated Characteristics and Performance* 
Kangaroo AS-3 Kitchen AS-4 AS-5 
IOC ................ ... ................ .. .... 1960-1961 1967 1965 
Maximum Range (nm) .... . .......... . . . ..... . 350 300 120 
Warhead Weight (l~ .... . ..... . .... 4, 500-5, 500 2,200 1 000-2.000 
h (,, ·..ll"-) -·- .. ~ ·' Accuracy TCEP)" -nm .... . ..... . ........ .. ..... 1-3 - - .. •O•o . .. H- • • •o -1-::.z--.. ----· 1 2 
Speed (Mach) .. .......... . ................... 1.8-2.0 3-4 at 80,000 ft 0.9-0.95 
Overall Reliability (%)• ..... . .... ........ ..... 75 65 70 
Improvement/Year ....... . . ..... . .. .... ... . . . . . . 75/100+2 yrs 75/1968 
Carrier Airorn.ft/Numbcr of Missiles . .. ... ....... Bear B&C/1 Blinder B/1 Badger/2 
Launch Altitude ft/Launch Speed (KTS) ....... . 36,000-39,000/420 40,000 b 30,000-35,000/440 
Guidance .......... ... ....................... Preprogrammed auto- Unknown Preprogrammed auto-
pilot with command pilot with command 
override. override. 
* We believe that the Soviets currently have in R&D a new ASM with nn estimated rnnge of a.bout 350 n.m. and a 
speed of Ma.ch 3. It bas almost certainly not achieved IOC. We do not know which uircraft may be intended to carry it 
or when it me.y become operational. 
• Does not include the reliability of the carrier aircraft. 
b There a.re no limitations on the speed at which this missile can be launched. 
_ .J 
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